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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Framers of the Constitution set forth the balance of power
between the branches of the federal government and the rights of
individuals, the central concern was the concentration of power in the
hands of one person. The United States Supreme Court voiced this
opinion by stating: "[w]icked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of
liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by
Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is conceded, and the calamities
of war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are frightful to
contemplate."'  This language illustrates the United States history of
fearing excessive power in one individual.
The military implicates one of the most difficult issues regarding
this balance of power. While the President is the Commander in Chief
and must be afforded all the powers and abilities to effectively manage
the military, Congress has the power to both declare war and enact
legislation to fund and govern the military. 2 This balance was tested in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which examined the President's ability to try
certain individuals in a military tribunal.3 This note will first examine
the history and authority for military commissions. 4 Then, with this
background as a foundation, it will examine the substantive issues raised
1. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866).
2. See U.S. CONST. arts. II, § 2, I, § 8.
3. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006).
4. See infra Part II.
1694 [Vol. 33:5
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in Hamdan.5 The substantive issues include whether the President has
the power to enact military commissions, whether the military
commissions have the power to try Hamdan, and whether the proceduresS • 6
authorized by the President invalidate the military commissions.
II. HISTORY AND AUTHORITY OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
A. Historical Development
Military law is a specialized area which is similar in form to civil
law yet in many ways a separate legal system. The body of military law
consists of a written code enacted by Congress, 7 as well as a body of
common-law that the courts and military custom have created.8
The traditional tribunal for military law in the United States is the
court-martial. 9 The court-martial itself is not a constitutional Article III
court, but is a power Congress grants to the President to maintain the
effectiveness of the military.10 Because the court-martial tribunal takes
all of its power from Congress, the tribunal is bound by the rules set forth
by Congress. In the past, the jurisdiction of the court-martial was very
limited, consisting of only military, personnel and civilians for a very
limited number of military offenses. In 1916, however, the Articles of
War expanded the jurisdiction of the court-martial to encompass all
"persons subject to military law," which is still in effect today. 12
When President Bush ordered the reinstitution of military
commissions, he created a tribunal that dates back to the nineteenth
5. See infra Part III.A-B.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000). Collectively these statutes make up the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
8. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (Government
Printing Office, 2d ed. 1920), reprinted in 11 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY LAW AND
HISTORY REPRINT SERIES, at 41 (Igor I. Kavass & Adolf Sprudzs eds., William S. Hein &
Co., Inc. 1979).
9. In 1775, the Continental Congress recognized the court-martial as the tribunal
for the military. See id. at 47.
10. See id. at 49; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (providing Congress with
the power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces").
11. See generally GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 42-60 (1st ed. 1898) (detailing the jurisdiction of courts-martial).
12. See Articles of War, 14 U.S.C.A. § 2308a art. 2 (West 1916); see generally
David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46
VA. J. INT'L L. 5, 57-59 (2005) (discussing the changes in the Articles of War).
169520071
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century, but which had not been used since World War 11.13 Military
commissions traditionally have been used in four different situations.
The first two uses are to provide a forum for U.S. soldiers outside of the
United States's borders, and for foreign civilians in territories controlled
by the United States. 14 Third, military commissions serve as a tribunal
for civilians and military personnel when martial law is declared within a
United States territory. Finally, military commissions are used to try
violations of the laws of war, which is the specific use employed in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 16
William Winthrop, the preeminent military historian, outlined the
requirements to institute military commissions. 17 First, the military
commissions can only have jurisdiction over offenses within the "field of
the command of the convening commander," which eliminates
jurisdiction of offenses committed where there is no theater of war.18
Second, the offenses heard by the military commissions must have been
committed during the period of a war. 19 Third, the military commissions
13. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001); see also Glazier, supra note 12, at 31,
66.
14. See WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 832-33. The term "military commission" was
coined by General Winfield Scott during the Mexican-American War, and was used as a
forum for military personnel and civilians in territories outside the United States
boundaries where the court-martial jurisdiction did not extend. Glazier, supra note 12, at
31-32. When General Scott created the military commissions, his goal was not to create
a summary tribunal and eliminate procedural safeguards, but to fashion an equivalent for
the court-martial tribunal. See id. at 32-33. General Scott did this by ordering the
military commission's procedures to be the same as the procedures of a court-martial, and
restricting the jurisdiction to areas cognizable by a court-martial. Id. at 33. General
Scott's order depicts this goal, stating: "[e]very military commission, under this order,
will be appointed, governed and limited, as prescribed by the 65th, 66th, 67th, and 97th,
of the said rules and articles of war ... provided, that no military commission shall try
any case clearly cognizable by any court-martial." Id.
15. See WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 846, 853-55. One example of this use occurred
at the beginning of World War II when martial law was declared in Hawaii, and General
Walter Short instituted military commissions to replace the local Hawaiian courts that
were still open and viable. Glazier, supra note 12, at 67. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the military commissions, holding that the military shall
always yield to the civilian laws, and therefore the military commissions were invalid
where courts were open and viable. 327 U.S. 304, 322-24 (1946).
16. See WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 832-33.
17. William Winthrop has been called the "Blackstone of Military Law," and his
treatise Military Law and Precedents is considered the leading military authority among
legal scholars. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 (2006) (quoting Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957)).
18. WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 836.
19. Id. at 837. "As in the ordinary criminal law one cannot legally be puished [sic]
for what is not an offence at the time of the sentence, so a military commission cannot...
1696 [Vol. 33:5
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can only have jurisdiction over a select group of people, which includes
individuals who have been charged with violations of the laws of war,
people who are located in a country "occupied and held by the right of
conquest," and individuals subject to martial law. Finally, the offenses
cognizable by military commissions are limited. For martial law and
occupied territory military commissions, all offenses "cognizable by
[s]tate or [federal] courts" may be heard. 2 1 However, for law of war
violations, military commissions can hear only "[v]iolations of the law
and usages of war." 22 The military commission's procedures generally
conform to those of a court-martial. 2
B. Common-law Military Commissions
The type of military commission used in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld was a
commission designed to handle violations of the laws of war.24 The
leading example of this military commission is Ex parte Quirin, which
occurred during World War 11.25 In this case, two groups of German
soldiers secretly landed on the shores of New York and Florida dressed
in civilian clothes, attempting to blow up different military
installations. The individuals were eventually captured, and Tpursuant
to President Roosevelt's Order, tried by a military commission.
The Quirin Court held that the President did have the power to
appoint military commissions to try the saboteurs. 28 The Court pointed
to Article 15 of the Articles of War, which stated that a "[m]ilitary
tribunal shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the
law of war in appropriate cases." The Court used this statutory
authority to show that Congress had authorized the President to create
military commissions wherever offenses against the laws of war were
alleged.30 The Court went on to state that the United States had adopted
legally assume jurisdiction of. . . an offence committed either before or after the war."
Id.
20. Id. at 838.
21. Id. at 839.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 841.
24. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006).
25. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
26. Id. at21.
27. Id. at 21-23; See Presidential Proclamation 2561: Appointment of a Military
Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942).
28. 317 U.S. at 26-28.
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all of the laws of war by reference. 3 1 This case is significant because
President Bush based his authority for military commissions on the
Court's holding in Exparte Quirin. 3
C. Statutory Authority Governing Military Commissions
There are two different codes governing military commissions, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions.
Both of these codes establish different limits and authority governing the
use and procedural protections of military commissions.
1. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
The UCMJ, which Congress enacted after the Articles of War, is the
statutory authority governing the military. 33  Through the Articles of
War and UCMJ, Congress authorized both the jurisdiction and
procedures of the courts-martial and military commissions. 
34
Originally, military commissions were not authorized by Congress,
but were used by the President as a common-law tribunal to hear cases
where a court-martial did not have jurisdiction. 35  In 1916, however,
Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the court-martial. 36  This
expansion worried some because the original reason for the existence of
military commissions-that of providing a tribunal where courts-martial
jurisdiction was lacking--ceased to exist.37  To allay these fears,
Congress enacted Article 15 of the Articles of War, which became
Article 21 of the UCMJ.3 8 Under this statute, military commissions still
had jurisdiction over all cases where it previously exercised jurisdiction
despite the creation of concurrent jurisdiction with the court-martial.
3 9
The current statutory authority allows the President to use military
31. Id. at 30.
32. See MAROUF HASIAN JR., IN THE NAME OF NECESSITY: MILITARY TRIBUNALS
AND THE Loss OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 139 (2005).
33. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107
(1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000)).
34. See Articles of War, 14 U.S.C. § 2308a art. 15, 18 (1916).
35. See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the
Mexican-American War military commissions); see also WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 831.
36. See Glazier, supra note 12, at 49-57; see also Articles of War, 14 U.S.C.A. §
2308a arts. 2, 15 (West 1916).
37. See Glazier, supra note 12, at 58-59.
38. See Articles of War, 14 U.S.C.A. § 2308a arts. 15, 18 (West 1916) (currently
codified as UCMJ art. 21 at 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000)).
39. See UCMJ art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
1698 [Vol. 33:5
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commissions, but limits their use to the common-law restrictions.
40
Prior to 1916, Congress had not enacted any general statutes
regarding the procedures of the courts-martial or military commissions.
41
However, in 1916, Congress enacted Article 38 into the Articles of War,
allowing the President to "prescribe the procedure, including modes of
proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military
commissions, and other military tribunals: Provided, That nothing
contrary to or inconsistent with these articles shall be so prescribed...
,,42
In 1950, Congress created the UCMJ and moved the prior language
into the new Article 36.43  This new Article 36 also contained a few
additions. It instructed the President to use "the principles of law and the
rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts," as far as he deems "practicable." 44 It also
provided that "[a]ll rules and regulations made in pursuance of this
article shall be uniform insofar as practicable." 45 Based on the evolution
of the language, Congress has intended to provide more guidance on the
procedures of courts-martial and military commissions, specifically
adherence to district court procedures.
2. The Geneva Conventions
After World War II, the United States became a signatory to the
1949 Geneva Conventions. 46  The Third Geneva Convention, which
went into effect on October 21, 1950, has become the major authority for
the treatment of prisoners of war. 47 One of the most expansive articles
40. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
41. See WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 313 n.2.
42. Articles of War, 14 U.S.C.A. § 2308a art. 38 (West 1916). During General
Crowder's testimony before Congress on this article, he testified that he wanted some
statutory authority to give guidance to military officers on technical rules of evidence,
and he never envisioned any substantial departure from the procedures of the district
courts. Glazier, supra note 12, at 61.
43. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, art. 36, 64
Stat. 107, 120 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000)). According to the
title of the Act creating the UCMJ, the purpose of its codification was to unify the
Articles of War, Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of
the Coast Guard into one body of law.
44. Id. art. 36(a).
45. Id. art. 36(b). The purpose of this language was to provide uniformity among
all the branches of the military. See Glazier, supra note 12, at 77.
46. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. This
Convention is commonly known as the "Third" Geneva Convention.
47. See ALLAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN
2007] 1699
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concerning potential parties to a military commission is Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, which pertains to the rights of persons taken into
custody within an "armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties."
' 48
Under this Article, a party may not convict or sentence a person "without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples." 49 According to the accompanying commentary, the
reason for the creation of Article 3 was that the Geneva Conventions
were "concerned with people as human beings, without re ard to their
uniform, their allegiance, [or] their race or their beliefs.. . ."R Thus, the
Geneva Conventions mandate that both signatories and non-signatories
provide procedural protections and regularly constituted courts to all
persons involved in armed conflict no matter their affiliation.
5 1
Both common-law and statutory authority provide a framework for
the violation of laws of war military commission, which is the type of
tribunal at issue in Hamdan. To create the military commission, a
violation of the laws of war must be alleged both during the period of
war and within the theater of war. In addition, once the military
commissions are established, the procedures may not violate any
protections in either the UCMJ or the Geneva Conventions.
III. ANALYSIS
The central issue presented to the Supreme Court in Hamdan was
how to maintain a balance of power within the federal government that is
consistent with both the intent of the Constitution and legal precedent
when the nation is at war. First, the Court appropriately ruled that the
President has the power to enact military commissions. Second, the
Court incorrectly ruled that President Bush could not use military
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 105, 86 n.97
(2005).
48. Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 3. This article is found in all the
Geneva Conventions and has been dubbed "Common Article 3." See Int'l Comm. of Red
Cross, Commentary, Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3 cmt. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, available at http://
www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=375&t--com [hereinafter Geneva
Convention Commentary].
49. Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 3(l)(d).
50. Geneva Convention Commentary, supra note 48, art. 3 cmt. 3.
51. For a discussion of the history of treatment of persons under Common Article 3,
see Thomas F. Berndt & Alethea M. Huyser, Ghost Detainees: Does the Isolation and
Interrogation of Detainees Violate Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?, 33
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1723 (2007).
1700 [Vol. 33:5
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commissions to try Hamdan. Finally, the Court accurately held that the
procedures utilized in President Bush's military commissions violated
both the UCMJ and the Geneva Commissions.
A. The President Has the Power to Enact Military Commissions
The framework for determining whether the President has the power
to enact military commissions is found in Justice Jackson's concurrence
to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 52 Under this framework,
when Congress has authorized the President to act, the President
possesses the broadest amount of power possible under the
Constitution. 53 Therefore, as long as the Constitution has authorized the
federal government to perform an action and Congress has approved the
President to perform that action, then the President has the full authority
of "the federal sovereignty" to act.54  Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate military commissions
by giving Congress the power "[t]o make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces,"' 55 which means that the
President must have authorization from Congress to enact military
commissions.
President Bush's military commissions are common-law war courts,
meaning that, at the time of Hamdan, there was no specific authorization
from Congress. 56  Despite this common-law status, the President had
authority to use military commissions because Congress had enacted, by
reference, all the common-law rules regarding the use of military
commissions in Article 21 of the UCMJ. 57 Therefore, because Congress
52. 343 U.S. 579, 634-655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 635. Justice Jackson went on to state that, "[i]n these circumstances, and
in these only, may [the President] be said (for what it may be worth), to personify the
federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it
usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power." Id. at
635-37.
54. See id.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. One scholar wrote that "[t]he framers placed the
war power in Congress because of their belief in a republic, popular control, and
representative democracy." See Louis FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS & PRESIDENTIAL
POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 16 (2005).
56. See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 20 n.7 (1946) (quoting General Crowder's
testimony before Congress, "[a] military commission is our commonlaw [sic] war court.
It has no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law").
57. See UCMJ art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). "Congress had the choice of
crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail every offense against the law of war,
or of adopting the system of common-law applied by military tribunals so far as it should
be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. It chose the latter ...." Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942). These common-law rules give the President the power to
2007]
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has authorized the President's war powers through the AUMF, 58 the
President has the power to create military commissions, limited by the
common-law restrictions and other statutes enacted by Congress as
outlined above.
B. The Military Commissions Have the Power to Try Hamdan
Even if the President has congressional authority to create military
commissions, Hamdan's circumstances must lend themselves to trial by
military commission under the common-law restrictions. 59 In Hamdan,
the Court should have ruled that Hamdan could be tried by military
commission because not only does the charge allege a violation of a law
of war, but also the alleged offense occurred both during the time of war
and within the theater of war, thus giving the military commission
jurisdiction over Hamdan.
1. The Government Charged Hamdan with a Violation of the
Laws of War
The President's complaint against Hamdan begins with a single
heading-"Charge: Conspiracy"-and then supports that charge by
60laying out the factual basis for the allegation. The Court stated in its
opinion that there was no authority to support the assertion that
conspiracy is a violation of the laws of war.6 1 Justice Thomas argued in
his dissent, however, that the complaint against Hamdan contained
allegations of two separate and distinct violations of the laws of war-
conspiracy and joining an illegal group. 6 2  Although Justice Thomas
correctly argued that the Government had alleged a violation of the laws
of war, his reasoning was flawed because the Government only charged
create military commissions, but also restrict their use through the restrictions outlined by
William Winthrop. See discussion supra Part II.A.
58. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress
activated the President's war powers when it enacted the Authorization for Use of
Military Force on September 18, 2001. 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). "Whereas, the
President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of
international terrorism against the United States: Now, therefore, be it." Authorization
for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
59. See generally discussion supra Part II.A.
60. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006). The complaint alleged that
Hamdan "willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common
criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to commit
the following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians.. . and
terrorism." Id.
61. Seeid. at2779-85.
62. Id. at 2830-31 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1702 [Vol. 33:5
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Hamdan with one violation of the laws of war-joining an illegal
organization.
a. The Government Charged Hamdan with Joining an Illegal
Organization
The Government charged Hamdan with conspiracy, and although
conspiracy might not appear to be a violation of the laws of war, the
elements of this crime, as described in the Code of Federal Regulations,
do constitute a violation of the laws of war. The central element of the
conspiracy crime charged in Hamdan is as follows: "The accused entered
into an agreement between one or more persons to commit one or more
substantive offenses triable by military commission or otherwise joined
an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose that
involved ... the commission ... of one or more substantive offenses
triable by military commission."
63
When the Court looked at whether conspiracy was a violation of the
laws of war, it only used the title of the charge to reason that conspiracy
was not a law of war violation. 64 Whatever title the President applies to
the crime, the elements are what dictate the prosecution of the crime and
should have been the focus of the Court's analysis. 65  Supreme Court
precedent has echoed this opinion by repeatedly holding that military
tribunal charges need not be stated with precision. 6 6  Thus, imprecise
63. Crimes and Elements for Trials by Military Commission, 32 C.F.R. §
11 .6(c)(6)(i)(A) (2006).
64. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780-81. When the Court referenced the conspiracy
definition in the Code of Federal Regulations, it discounted it as being "defined not by
Congress but by the President," thus implying the definition had no weight. See id. at
2778 n.30. In civilian criminal law, the fact that Congress did not enact the elements of a
crime is of consequence because Congress dictates the criminal code. That the President
defined the elements of conspiracy is of no matter because the common laws of war are
not codified by Congress, but are applicable only by reference. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
65. To illustrate, in Minnesota, the charge of first-degree murder includes murder
while participating in a drive-by shooting, but the federal statute has no mention of drive-
by shooting in its statute. Both of these crimes are titled first-degree murder, but any
analysis of the crime must follow from its elements. Compare 18 U.S.C. § Ii1 l(a)
(2000), with MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(3) (2006). A good illustration of the wide variety
of the elements under first-degree murder is available in Westlaw's 50-state survey of
first-degree murder. See THOMSON WEST, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, CRIMINAL
LAW: CRIMES: FELONY MURDER (2006) (available in Westlaw "SURVEYS" database).
66. See Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416, 420 (1922) ("It is not necessary that the
charge in court-martial proceedings should be framed with the technical precision of a
common-law indictment ...."); see also Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946)
("Obviously charges of violations of the law of war triable before a military tribunal need
not be stated with the precision of a common-law indictment.
2007] 1703
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titling of a charge should not affect how the elements of the crime are
pursued. Based on this distinction, the focus of the law of war analysis
should not be on the title of the charge, but rather should concentrate on
the substance of the charge. Therefore, the elements of the President's
charge sufficiently allege that Hamdan joined an organization that
violated the laws of war.
b. Joining an Illegal Organization Is a Violation of the Laws
of War
The Government alleged that Hamdan joined an illegal
organization, namely al Qaeda. 6 7 As discussed by Justice Thomas, this
alleged action by Hamdan was a violation of the laws of war, which gave
a military commission jurisdiction to try the case. 68 Joining an illegal
organization is a law of war violation because both primary and
secondary authority recognizes it as such.
A primary authority supporting this argument is the Geneva
Conventions, which considers membership in a group that violates the
laws of war a violation in and of itself. The Geneva Conventions
consider attacks on civilians, like the one that occurred on September 11,
2001, as a violation of the laws of war. 6 9  Under the Geneva
Conventions, a person is entitled to prisoner of war status, and
considered a lawful combatant, only if they are a member of a group that
does not commit any violations of the laws of war. Based on this
language, membership in an organization that violates the laws of war is
the crucial requirement to being considered a lawful or unlawful
combatant, and, if unlawful, subject to jurisdiction of a military
commission.
71
A secondary authority supporting this argument is William
Winthrop, who defines guerillas or unlawful combatants as "[i]rregular
armed bodies or persons not forming part of the organized forces of a
belligerent." 72 Based on this authority, any individual who is a member
67. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760-61.
68. Id. at 2832-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. See Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 3.
70. See Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 4 (using the term "member" to
designate who qualifies for protection).
71. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
72. WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 783. In Winthrop's discussion of guerillas, he
states that guerillas "are not in general recognized as legitimate troops," and have been
subject to trial for violations of the laws of war. Id. at 783-84. Winthrop goes on to state
that one characteristic of a guerilla group is participation in the "killing ... of peaceable
citizens." Id. at 784.
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of a group that has violated the laws of war constitutes a violation by that
individual person. Therefore, since the Government charged Hamdan
with joining al Qaeda, the Government has satisfied the first common-
law requirement for a military commission's jurisdiction.
2. The Government Alleged an Offense Within the Theater and
Period of War
Regarding the location and date of the alleged offense, the Court
incorrectly reasoned that the military commission did not have
jurisdiction over Hamdan because the Government did not allege any
overt acts by Hamdan within the theater or period of war.73 Here, the
charge alleged that Hamdan was a member of al Qaeda until he was
detained in November of 2001, two months after Congress enacted the
AUMF. 74  Thus, the military commissions have jurisdiction over
Hamdan because he was detained in Afghanistan, the theater of war,75
after the enactment of the AUMF, within the period of war.
C. The Procedures Authorized by the President Invalidate the Military
Commissions
While the President does have the power to enact military
commissions and try Hamdan, the President cannot ignore required
procedural protections. Throughout history, military commissions have
traditionally used the same procedures as the courts-martial. 76 Congress
and the Geneva Conventions both recognized this tradition and
subsequently enacted rules mandating these procedures. 77 Therefore, the
Court correctly ruled that the procedures fail to meet the requirements of
both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions, invalidating the military
commissions.
1. The Military Commissions' Procedures Violate the Uniform
Code of Military Justice
As stated above, Article 36 of the UCMJ requires the procedures of
73. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2778.
74. Congress enacted the AUMF on September 18, 2001. See Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
75. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (holding that persons
captured in Afghanistan are the individuals Congress intended to target when it enacted
the AUMF).
76. See WINTHROP, supra note 8, at 841.
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both courts-martial and military commissions to reflect district court
procedure as much as practicable and to not contradict any provision
within the UCMJ. 78  Based on Article 36, Congress has expressly
directed the procedures for both courts-martial and military
commissions. By expressly limiting the President, Congress acted within
its constitutional authority and limited any power the President possessed
to dictate the procedures of the military commissions as common-law
courts. 79 The Court was correct to rule that the procedures violate the
UCMJ because the Government does not possess enough need for a
departure from the courts-martial procedures and the procedures violate
protections specifically guaranteed by the UCMJ.
a. The Government Does Not Possess Enough Practicable
Need to Depart from the Courts-Martial Procedures
The procedures of the military commission render this tribunal
invalid because there are not enough practicable reasons to vary from the
court-martial procedures. The Government cited the exigencies of war
and the protection of intelligence secrets as reasons for a practicable need
for divergent procedures. This reasoning fails because historical and
contemporary authorities hold differently.
i. The Exigencies of War Are Not a Practicable Need
A few of the reasons given for the divergent procedures were that
the indefinite length of the war on terrorism and the Government's desire
not to impede the war effort necessitated the departure from the court-
martial procedures. While these concerns are valid, they were not the
78. UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000). Because the procedures of a court-
martial are consistent with the UCMJ, the military commissions must mimic the court-
martial when practicable. According to the legislative history of Article 36, subsection
(b) only applies to uniformity among the military branches. See supra note 45.
79. See UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000); see also supra note 57. After
Congress expressly limited the President to enact procedures for the courts-martial and
military commissions, the President's power is at "its lowest ebb." See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The President must act consistently within Congressional legislation
because the Constitution has expressly granted the power of regulating the government of
the military to Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
80. See News Transcript, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of
Defense News Briefing on Military Commissions (Mar. 21,
2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=3367; see also Brief for Respondents at 47 n.22, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126
S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) (referencing the "the danger to the safety of the United
States and the nature of international terrorism" as the reasons for the departure).
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reasons contemplated when the language of Article 36 was enacted.
General Enoch Crowder, who Congress consulted when it enacted the
language of Article 36, testified that the reason for allowing the President
to proscribe the procedures was to permit technical procedural
differences, not to give the President the power to make significant
changes to the procedures of military commissions. 8 1  Under this
reasoning, Congress did not intend to give the President the power to
depart from the general framework of the courts-martial procedures.
Based on this authority, the military commissions are invalid because the
procedures vary significantly from the courts-martial procedures. 
82
Other military leaders who have faced the difficulties and
exigencies of war share this view of Article 36's construction. General
Winfield Scott, the creator of military commissions, was the first United
States commander to fight a war completely outside the borders of the
United States, and because of this, faced many difficulties such as
fighting a considerably larger army and relying on the local population• 83 ...
for supplies. Despite these significant difficulties, he mandated that his
military commissions use the courts-martial procedures. 
84
During the beginning of the Civil War, the deadliest war in United
States history, General Henry Halleck wrote in a general order why the
military commissions needed to provide the same protections as the
court-martial procedures. "Military commissions must be ... conducted
according to the same general rules as courts-martial in order to prevent
abuses which might otherwise arise." 85 Both of these military leaders
recognized that despite the exigencies of war, the military commission's
purpose is not for procedural flexibility, but to provide a competent
tribunal where none exists.
ii. The Protection of Intelligence Secrets Is Not a
81. See Glazier, supra note 12, at 61-62. One commentator added that the Army
General Staff s War College Division agreed with General Crowder and deleted from its
draft the language in Article 36 that allowed the President to change the procedures,
"fearing the language could be read broadly enough to allow 'the President the power to
alter the more essential rules of evidence."' Id. at 62 (quoting Letter from the Secretary
of the War to the Chairman of the Senate Committee of Military Affairs (Jan. 3, 1916)).
82. See infra Part III.C.l.b (explaining the differences between military
commissions and court-martial procedures).
83. See Glazier, supra note 12, at 31-33.
84. Id. at 33.
85. Glazier, supra note 12, at 42 (quoting Henry W. Halleck, Headquarters
Department of the Missouri, Gen. Order No. 1 (Jan. 1, 1862), in 1 THE WAR OF THE
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE
ARMIES SER. II 248 (1894)).
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Practicable Need
Another reason given for the different procedures is the preservation
of intelligence secrets.86 This reasoning is flawed. The trial of Zacarias
Moussaoui demonstrates that a court can provide all the procedural
protections guaranteed by the Constitution, while preserving the national
security interests of the Government. Although numerous issues created
challenges for all the parties and judges involved with United States v.
Moussaoui, the trial was successfully completed. 87  One example of a
constitutional procedural problem solved in Moussaoui involved the
Government's refusal to allow defense counsels access to witnesses who
had connections to international terrorism. 88 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia attempted to solve this problem by admitting
substitute statements from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and others for the
jury to weigh, instead of allowing complete access by the defense.
89
This case shows that despite the necessary difficulties of preserving
national security interests, compromises between the rights of the
accused and national security are possible. Whether it means
substituting names and places to protect information, redacting sensitive
information, or reducing access to witnesses, a federal district court has
86. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 80, at 47 n.22; News Transcript,
Department of Defense News Briefing on Military Commissions, supra note 80.
87. See generally The Moussaoui Case Revisited (Twin Cities Public Television and
The National Security Forum at William Mitchell College of Law, Oct. 22, 2006) (on file
with author) (providing a general discussion of the Moussaoui trial and its associated
difficulties).
88. Before Moussaoui's trial, the United States captured a number of individuals,
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who provided evidence that possibly exculpated
Moussaoui from involvement in the September 11 th attacks. See United States v.
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457-58 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Josh Meyer, A New Name in
9/11 Plot Surfaces, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at Al. During his appeal to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Moussaoui argued that under the Sixth Amendment he had a
right to access these individuals. The Government countered that under the authority of
separation of powers and national security the defense could not question either
individual, but offered other substitutions such as statements by the individuals.
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 469-70, 471-72.
89. See Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, United States
v. Zacarias Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. 2006), available at http://
www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/defense/941.pdf. To assist the
jury, the court inserted language into the statement to give it proper weight. The
following quote shows two examples of this language used to aid the jury. "You should
assume that if Sheikh Mohammed were available to testify in this courtroom under oath
and subject to perjury he would have said what is contained in these statements.
Although you do not have the ability to see the witness's demeanor as he testifies, you
must approach these statements with the understanding that they were made under
circumstances designed to elicit truthful statements from the witness." Id. at 1-2.
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solved these problems. Based on this solution, it is practicable for the
military commissions to resolve these competing interests and provide
the same procedural protections afforded defendants in court-martial
proceedings.
b. The Procedures Violate Sections of the UCMJ
Even if the President finds that there are practical reasons to depart
from the court-martial standard, the procedures cannot contradict any
sections of the UCMJ. 90 The effect of this language is to preclude the
President, regardless of the circumstances, from varying military court
rules prescribed by Congress. 9 1 President Bush's military commissions
violate a few significant sections of the UCMJ, making the military
commissions invalid. One of the military commissions' procedures
stated that all evidence is admissible if it is probative to a reasonable92
person. This rule is in direct conflict with Article 50 of the UCMJ,
which states that evidence from a court of inquiry is admissible in a
courts-martial proceeding if, among other restrictions, it complies with
the rules of evidence, such as the rule of hearsay. 93 Additionally, while
the military commissions allow unsworn testimony, the UCMJ requires
all witnesses to be under oath.94 Under the UCMJ, a specific appellate
process is set up to hear appeals from every case, and the judges are
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to ensure their
impartiality. 95 However, under the review process for all but the most
serious military commission cases, the President is the final authority on
each case. 96 Finally, the most significant discrepancy is that the military
90. UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000).
91. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Since Congress possesses the sole power to
regulate the military, the President cannot enact procedures that contradict any section in
the UCMJ. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
92. "Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the Presiding Officer,. . . the
evidence would have probative value to a reasonable person." 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(d)(1)
(2006).
93. UCMJ art. 50, 10 U.S.C. § 850(a) (2000).
94. Compare 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(d)(2)(ii) (2006) ("The Commission may still hear a
witness who refuses to swear an oath or make a solemn undertaking; however, the
Commission shall consider the refusal to swear an oath or give an affirmation in
evaluating the weight to be given to the testimony of the witness."), with UCMJ art. 42,
10 U.S.C. § 842(b) (2000) ("Each witness before a court-martial shall be examined on
oath.").
95. "Each judge of the court shall be appointed from civilian life by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ..... UCMJ art. 42, 10 U.S.C. §
942(b) (2000).
96. After each trial, a review panel not confirmed by the Senate but merely
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commissions' procedures allow the presiding officer to close the
proceeding from the defendant and his or her counsel whenever the
presiding officer deems it necessary. 97  The UCMJ prescribes the
opposite by dictating that the defendant and counsel always be present at
the proceeding. 9 8 These differences show that the military commissions
completely disregard the rules of the UCMJ specifically set up to protect
the defendant.9 9  Because these significant disparities substantively
violate Article 36(a), the military commissions are invalid.
2. The Procedures of the Military Commissions Violate Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Convention provisions concerning the treatment of
prisoners of war are in part a codification of the laws of war, as well as
an agreement concerning the treatment, including adjudication, of
prisoners of war. 100 The Court correctly ruled that Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions applies to Hamdan, and that procedures of proper
military commissions require more procedural protections than are
afforded by these military commissions. 101 Article 3 applies "[i]n the
case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." 10 2 Article 3 provides
that a High Contracting Party may not judge any non-combatant without
"previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."'
03
Article 3 applies to this case because the war on terror is a conflict
occurring within the territory of a High Contracting Party, one of the
Parties is a High Contracting Party, and the conflict is not of an
appointed by the Secretary of Defense reviews the record of the trial. 32 C.F.R. §
9.6(h)(4) (2006). "After review by the Secretary of Defense, the record of trial and all
recommendations will be forwarded to the President for review and final decision .
Id. § 9.6(h)(6).
97. Id. § 9.6(b)(3).
98. "Proceedings under subsection (a) shall be conducted in the presence of the
accused, the defense counsel, and the trial counsel ..... UCMJ art. 39, 10 U.S.C. §
839(b) (2000).
99. Id. § 836(b).
100. See Geneva Convention, supra note 46, pmbl. "The Geneva Conventions form
part of what are generally known as the laws and customs of war, violations of which are
commonly called 'war crimes."' Geneva Convention Commentary, supra note 48, art.
129 Historical Background.
101. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2793 (2006).
102. Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 3.
103. Id. See Berndt & Huyser, supra note 51, for a discussion of further
requirements in Article 3.
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international character. 104 First, the United States, a High Contracting
Party, is fighting the War on Terror against al Qaeda in Afghanistan,
thus, the conflict is occurring within the territory of a High Contracting
Party, Afghanistan.l°5 This conflict is not of an international character,
because, as described by the Court, Article 3 refers to conflicts where
one party is not a nation or country.106
By looking at the term "international" and comparing it to the
context of the Geneva Conventions, the precise meaning emerges. The
first definition of "international," in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, refers to the description of two or more nations or•• 107
countries. A conflict not of an international character then refers to a
conflict where one or more parties is not a nation. Furthermore, the
context of Article 3 also illuminates the definition of "international."
Article 2 refers to conflicts where there are two High Contracting
Parties. 108 However, Article 3 drops the phrase "High Contracting" and
uses the word "Party" when referring to the duties implemented by
Article 3, implying that Article 3 applies to conflicts where one party is
not a nation. 109 Therefore, because al Qaeda is not a nation or
country, 110 Article 3 must apply to the conflict between the United States
and al Qaeda.
Article 3 then invalidates the military commissions because they are
not a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'' The
central reason why military commissions are not the regular court of the
United States for trying military personnel is that the UCMJ has set the
104. A High Contracting Party is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions.
105. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795, 2795 n.60 (noting that Afghanistan is a
signatory of the Geneva Conventions, and the government previously stated that the
Conventions applied to the conflict with the Taliban).
106. Id. at 2795-96.
107. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
1181 (Phillip Babcock Grove et al. eds, Merriam-Webster Inc. 1993).
108. "[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties." Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 2.
109. See Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 3. One commentator agreeing with
this position wrote, "[t]here is no substantive reason why the norms that apply to an
armed conflict between a state and an organized armed group within its territory should
not also apply to an armed conflict with such a group that is not restricted to its territory."
David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or
Legitimate Means ofDefence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 195 (2005).
110. See Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or
"Prisoners of War": The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 82
(2003).
111. Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 3.
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courts-martial as the regular court. 112 In addition, by enacting the
UCMJ, both Congress and the President have held that a court-martial
provides enough procedural protections for the United States military,
which should be the standard for "civilized people." 11 3 The procedural
protections of the military commissions fall short of the UCMJ, violating
the standard Congress has identified as guarantees "indispensable by
civilized peoples." 114  Consequently, the military commissions violate
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which makes them an
inappropriate tribunal for Hamdan. 
115
D. Congress's Military Commissions Act Provides Further Guidance
for the President
Following the Hamdan decision, on October 17, 2006, the President
signed the Military Commissions Act into law. 116 The effect of this law
gave specific authorization for military commissions and provided
guidance on the procedures for this tribunal. Although Congress
generally stayed true to the conclusions of the Hamdan Court, it diverged
in a few areas.
1. Congressional Authority for the Creation of Military
Commissions
The Military Commissions Act of 2006117 provides "[t]he President
... authoriz[ation] to establish military commissions . . . for offenses
triable by military commission as provided in this chapter." 118  This
blanket authorization removed any questions concerning the President's
authority to use military commissions. In addition, Congress restricted
jurisdiction of the military commissions to only persons alleged to have
112. See UCMJ arts. 17, 18,21, 10U.S.C. §§ 817,818,821(2000).
113. The Geneva Conventions recognize that the court regularly used to try a
country's military force satisfies the provisions of the Geneva Convention for procedural
protections. See Geneva Convention, supra note 46, art. 102.
114. See supra text accompanying note 113; see also supra Part III.C. 1.b (identifying
all the discrepancies between the procedures of President Bush's military commissions
and the procedures guaranteed by the UCMJ).
115. See Berndt & Huyser, supra note 51, for a discussion of whether CIA practices
violate Common Article 3.
116. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs Military
Commissions Act of 2006, (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1 .html.
117. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120
Stat. 2600 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w).
118. 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(b) (West 2007).
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violated the laws of war or one of the specifically defined offenses. 119
Unfortunately, Congress failed to fully enumerate the violations of
the laws of war triable by military commissions, but only referred to the
laws of war generally. 120 The effect of this failure is that confusion as to
what constitutes the laws of war still exists, and there is a potential for
the same debate as is depicted in the conspiracy discussion above. 12 1 In
addition, Congress failed to address the other common-law restrictions,
specifically violations occurring within the period and theater of war.122
Therefore, the President could read this act as allowing the military
commissions to take jurisdiction over persons on a much broader scale
than just persons captured in Afghanistan or other theaters of war. Such
an interpretation would be inaccurate because the common-law
restrictions on military commissions are still intact due to Congress's
failure to address them. Although Congress did settle some issues
regarding the President's authority to create military commissions,
significant questions remain unanswered.
2. Congressional Authority for the Procedures of the Military
Commissions
Congress did provide significant guidance on the procedures for the
military commissions. Specifically, Congress required procedures for
the military commissions to be based on the courts-marital procedures set
forth in the UCMJ. 123 One such procedure furthers the interests of the
defendant. Under the Military Commissions Act, an appeal goes through
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and ends
by allowing certiorari petitions to the United States Supreme Court.
124
Another procedure provides that the defendant can only be excluded
from the proceedings if he or she is disruptive. 125
Although some of these procedures protect the defendant, Congress
also gave the President authority to use many questionable procedures
that will inevitably work against the defendant. One example is that the
119. Id. § 948d(a); See id. § 950v(b) (defining twenty-eight triable crimes, including:
attacking civilians, terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, and conspiracy).
120. "A military commission under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to try any
offense made punishable by this chapter or the law of war." Id. § 948d(a).
121. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
123. "Such procedures shall, so far as the Secretary considers practicable or
consistent with military or intelligence activities, apply the principles of law and the rules
of evidence in trial by general courts-martial." 10 U.S.C.A. § 949a(a) (West 2007).
124. Id. § 950g(a), (d).
125. Id. § 949d(e).
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Military Commissions Act allows departures from the courts-martial
procedures whenever the Secretary of Defense considers them
practicable or inconsistent with military objectives. 126  Additionally,
Congress allows the military commissions to use hearsay evidence
during any proceedings as long as the defendant is notified ahead of
time. Through the Military Commissions Act, Congress has provided
significantly more procedural protections to the defendant than were
previously allowed, but these protections are less than are afforded to
U.S. military forces. This leaves a window open for wide interpretation,
which could result in future conflict about the military commissions.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the United States continues to fight the War on Terror, the issue
of balancing military power among the branches will continue to be a
divisive issue. Despite this difficult issue, the United States must
continue to fight the War on Terror. Thus, the United States as a whole
must fashion a workable solution that effectively provides for all
competing interests.
The Supreme Court tried to balance this military power in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld by analyzing the President's military commissions. Based
on this balancing, the Hamdan Court correctly ruled that the President
had the power to create military commissions because Congress
specifically authorized the jurisdiction of the military commissions.
Despite this correct ruling, the Court should have held that Hamdan's
situation lent itself to trial by military commissions, given that the
Government alleged a violation of the laws of war that took place within
the theater and the period of war. Finally, the Court was right to
invalidate the military commissions because the procedures conflicted
with both the UCMJ and Geneva Conventions.
Congress attempted to balance this military power in the Military
Commissions Act.m28 Although the legislation did answer questions as
to some issues, such as the power of the President to convene military
commissions and evidentiary issues, many more exist. Some of the
issues left unanswered by Congress include defining violations of the
laws of war, addressing other common-law restrictions to military
commissions, delineating the powers of the Secretary of Defense to enact
procedures inconsistent with the courts-martial procedures, and whether
126. Id. § 949a(a).
127. Id. § 949a(b)(2)(E).
128. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 117.
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CIA interrogation practices violate the Geneva Conventions. 1
29
Despite attempts by the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President
to balance the power of the military with the nation's commitment to
judicial rights, 3 not one branch has succeeded. The effect of this
uncertainty could possibly lead to continued division and conflicts within
the United States, and will undoubtedly result in further cases that
address the balance of military power.
129. See Huyser & Berndt, supra note 51, examining CIA practices under Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
130. Compare Military Commissions Act, supra note 117, with Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), and
Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-18.6 (2006).
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